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Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: The Contribution of 
Forgiveness Towards Healing and Restoration 
 




Forgiveness is primarily addressed in the transitional justice discourse as a restorative value, 
as part of several concepts complementing retributive justice (Braithwaite and Strang 2001). 
Scholars define restorative justice by emphasising it either as a value or as a process, and the 
same logic applies to forgiveness. It could be conceived as a process where a group of 
individuals or societies come together to solve issues. Forgiveness can relieve the burdens 
created by wrongful actions and intolerable debts and suggests that both victim and 
perpetrator can start afresh (Digeser 2001). It might even imply the re-establishment of 
moral equality between the parties. This chapter suggests that forgiveness is a valuable and 
complementary mechanism for healing and restoration of individuals and societies. 
 
Civil society, through direct contact, provides linkages between all concerned and 
has the potential for motivating forgiveness by providing a crucial arena for dialogue 
between individuals, groups and political institutions. Civil society mechanisms, both formal 
and informal, make them more directly connected with communities and individuals. This 
provides civil societies with greater insights into the workings of people and multicultural 
groups (formal and informal; secular and religious), as well as enhances opportunities to 
enable innovative mechanisms for finding solutions for conflict resolution. 
 
Forgiveness and reconciliation cannot be mandated from the top down but could be 
a dynamic and interactive process between individuals and civil society actors at grassroots 
level. However, that implies a need to broaden our understanding of forgiveness as a 
mechanism for healing and restoration of individuals, social and political groups. A number 
of researchers (Hartwell 2006, Digeser 2001, Montiel 2000, Andrews 2000) argue that the 
complexity of the concept highlights the need for a more independent and secular 
interpretation of forgiveness than that typically used. 
 
The moral and religious connotations might inhibit us from understanding the value 
of forgiveness as a pragmatic, diverse and complementary reconciliation mechanism. At the 
same time, it is the focus on values that distinguishes forgiveness from traditional notions of 
punitive justice. Restorative justice is focused on healing rather than hurting. The traditional 
notion of responding to the hurt of an offence with the hurt of punishment is rejected – 
along with its corresponding value of proportionality. ‘The idea is that the value of healing is 
the key because the crucial dynamic to foster is healing that begets healing. The dynamic to 
avert is hurt that begets hurt’ (Braithwaite and Strang 2001). Ultimately, seeking forgiveness 
might be the only way for a society to move on from conflict, as traditional justice is often 
unavailable or indeed imperfect (Digeser 1998). These things have been important in the last 
20 years, at times motivated by civil society, therefore it requires us to understand 
forgiveness in various forms. 
 
The goal for civil society actors is to develop a collective history, identity and 
memory as a basis for a new vision of society. The limitations of forgiveness are recognised. 
Healing is a threefold exercise and constitutes mechanisms of restoration, compensation 
and reconciliation through acknowledgement of past hurt. Forgiveness enables the 
opportunity of moving on but cannot be isolated from these factors. The valuable role of 
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trials and Truth Commissions is acknowledged, however these mechanisms need 
complementation to achieve restoration and reconciliation. 
 
Justice is considered the established paradigm for social repair and the predominant 
view is that retributive justice is essential to conflict resolution (Digeser 1998). Fletcher and 
Weinstein (2002) make a convincing argument for expanding the discourse by asking crucial 
questions pertaining to whether it is possible at all to find a single answer to the meaning of 
justice, and if justice is the best way to address feelings of loss and helplessness in any 
society. 
 
The argument of this chapter is that the reconciliation process ought to include a 
variety of mechanisms. Among these, forgiveness is one way to help people heal that 
deserves more attention. The linkage between justice and forgiveness is discussed before 
we scrutinise forgiveness as a concept – both theoretically and from religious perspectives. 
This is followed by psychologist Robert Enright’s (1991) process model of forgiveness which 
offers a useful framework for examining how forgiveness can play a role in the reconciliation 
process. The model lays out a step-by-step process towards unconditional forgiveness, 
emphasising it as a complex, unilateral process with various pathways. It illustrates an 
approach to forgiveness that is useful both at the individual and social level, and its benefits 
are supported by substantial research (Freedman, Enright and Knutson 2005, Hartwell 2006). 
We then consider examples of personal forgiveness as well as state-led attempts at 
reconciliation to illustrate the gap between state and individuals in a post-conflict situation. 
Finally, social healing and the potential benefits of forgiveness for society are discussed.  
 
Justice and Forgiveness 
 
The relationship between justice and forgiveness is fundamental for our understanding of 
these two concepts, which are heavily interlinked. Digeser (2001) understands justice as 
‘receiving one’s due’, while forgiveness is the release of such debts, both monetary and 
moral. This involves differing approaches to conflict resolution and might also lead to 
contrasting results. Hence, they are best understood as complementary concepts. 
 
According to the so-called ‘normal model of justice’, forgiveness simply leaves 
victims with less than is their due. If justice implies that it is good to receive what is due, and 
it is possible to obtain justice, how could forgiveness ever be justified? This perspective 
dominates political theory where forgiveness is disregarded because the availability of 
‘perfect’ justice is considered to trump all other concerns (Digeser 2001). Yet, this argument 
suggests that it is possible to restore justice adequately, which is a problematic assumption – 
particularly so in a post-conflict situation. 
 
The assumption that justice represents rationality and politics, while forgiveness is 
personal, perhaps even irrational, is not uncommon and is enforced by limited scholarly 
attention given to this subject. In competition with justice, forgiveness does not seem to 
have good odds: 
 
From a certain perspective, there seems to be something deeply irrational about 
forgiveness, particularly if rationality is understood as a way to connect  available 
means to desired ends. (Digeser 2001) 
 
Justice is about making the offender pay his or her debt while forgiveness entails 
achieving a state of reconciliation where the debt no longer serves as the basis for future 
claims. As such, both concepts seek to settle the past in ways that do not legitimately 
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impede the future (Digeser 2001). However, values such as forgiveness, compassion and 
mercy inherently rely on a minimum demand of justice being met. 
 
The Concept of Forgiveness  
The last decade has seen increasing scholarly interest in forgiveness; nonetheless, this 
research has been dominated by psychological approaches (McCullough et al. 2005). The 
process of forgiveness in post-conflict environments has yet to receive the same amount of 
attention, and scholars across various academic disciplines such as political theory, 
anthropology, philosophy and socio-legal studies are starting to examine the issue (Hartwell 
2006). 
 
The study of forgiveness raises methodological and definitional problems. It is 
empirically difficult to examine and no clear definition exists. There is also a lack of thorough 
understanding of the influences of religion, culture and life situation on people’s 
understanding and experience of forgiveness. McCullough, Pargament and Thoresen (2000) 
express the complexity of forgiveness through these questions: ‘what psychological factors 
are involved in forgiveness? What are its personality and biological substrates? Is the 
capacity to forgive largely guided by individual factors, situational factors or the interaction 
of personality and situation? Is forgiveness an unmitigated psychological and social good, or 
does it involve costs to the forgiver, the person forgiven, or society?’ 
 
There is no consensual definition of forgiveness, but conceptual progress seems to 
have been made (Worthington 1998). Researchers tend to agree that forgiveness is different 
from ‘pardoning’, which is a legal term; ‘condoning’, which implies justification of the 
offence; ‘excusing’, which implies the offender has a good reason for committing the 
offence; ‘forgetting’, which implies that the memory of the offence has simply decayed or 
slipped out of conscious awareness, and ‘denying’, which involves an unwillingness to 
perceive the harmful injuries that one has incurred (Enright and Coyle 1998, cited in 
McCullough et al. 2000). 
 
Nonetheless, all the existing definitions share one common concept that, when 
people forgive, their responses toward the offender become less negative and more 
positive. McCullough, Pargament and Thoresen (2000: 9) suggest that forgiveness is ‘intra-
individual, prosocial change toward a perceived transgressor that is situated within a specific 
interpersonal context’. They view forgiveness as a process by which the forgiver changes 
when forgiving. Freedman, Enright and Knutson (2005: 393) emphasise how the relationship 
between victim and offender changes, but in a unilateral way: 
 
People, upon rationally determining that they have been unfairly treated, forgive 
when they wilfully abandon resentment and related responses (to which they have a 
right) and endeavour to respond to the wrongdoer based on the moral principle of 
beneficence, which may include compassion, unconditional worth, generosity, and 
moral love (to which the wrongdoer, by  nature of the hurtful act or acts, has no 
right). 
 
The core meaning of forgiveness as a way to release hurt remains unchallenged 
(Freedman et al. 2005). 
 
Religion and Forgiveness 
The perceived association between religion and forgiveness and its theological baggage 
might explain the reluctance of researchers to engage with the topic and further adds to the 
4 
 
perception of a dichotomy between justice and forgiveness. However, considerations of 
religion and culture for the process of forgiveness and reconciliation are crucial to our 
understanding of these mechanisms and should not be underestimated (Fletcher and 
Weinstein 2002: 637, Hartwell 2006). While important to avoid generalisations, it is valuable 
for social scientists to examine the long-standing and diverse religious conceptualisations of 
forgiveness rather than understanding forgiveness as a set construct. Perspectives on 
forgiveness vary across religious traditions, as do interpretations within the respective 
traditions. However, the importance placed on forgiveness and justice in most societies 
reflects a commonality across cultures and religions. Elements from different religions or 
belief system might in some cultures also be combined. Most studies have focused on 
forgiveness and Christianity or Judaism and given less attention to the perspective of other 
religions. Even less work has been done on comparing the concept of forgiveness across 
religions (Rye et al. 2000). 
 
Nonetheless, structures that encourage forgiveness are found in the major world 
religions. It is explicitly addressed in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Judaism while in 
Buddhism it is integrated into the concepts of compassion and forbearance (Rye et al. 2000). 
At the same time in most religions the availability of religious doctrine, which justifies 
measures of retributive justice and revenge, is noteworthy (McCullough et al. 2005). Religion 
as a meaning system might be abstract enough to offer justifications for both forgiveness 
and revenge, providing individuals with rationalisations for their motivation for either 
forgiving or not forgiving (Tsang et al. 2005). 
 
In the Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) humans are expected to 
imitate God, who has a forgiving nature. Forgiveness is encouraged in Islam and both Allah 
and Mohammad function as role models for forgiveness (Tsang et al. 2005). In Judaism 
forgiveness is defined as the removal of a violation, making a renewed relationship between 
victim and offender possible. However, forgiveness is not required under all circumstances 
and reconciliation is not necessarily part of the forgiveness process (Dorff 1998, cited in 
Tsang et al. 2005). Forgiveness is central to the Christian doctrine, and unlike Judaism it does 
not rely on a remorseful offender. In Hinduism, forgiveness is one of several ethical concepts 
to be followed on the path to righteousness. According to both Buddhism and Hinduism, 
unresolved issues will reappear in subsequent reincarnations. Islam, Christianity and 
Buddhism appear to encourage forgiveness irrespective of whether the offender expresses 
repentance, or the severity of the crime. Judaism, on the other hand, has clear rules about 
when one should forgive, and Jews question whether forgiving the Holocaust is possible or 
desirable (Rye et al. 2000). 
 
Forgiveness in Buddhism is less straightforward. According to Charles Hallisey, a 
Buddhist scholar, the category of forgiveness per se is not central in Buddhism, but 
forbearance and compassion are key religious virtues that combined can resemble 
forgiveness (cited in Rye et al. 2000). Compassion eases the pain and suffering of the 
offender while forbearance abstains from causing more suffering, both for oneself and 
others. Hallisey interprets forgiveness as a twofold exercise where the call for retribution is 
dismissed and resentment and other negative sentiments towards an offender renounced 
(cited in Rye et al. 2000). Forbearance is considered more inclusive than forgiveness, as it 
entails enduring the suffering caused by the offender as well as renouncing anger and 
resentment towards that person. In addition, the virtues of compassion and pity leads the 
Buddhist to empathise with the suffering of the offender as well as taking steps towards 
easing this suffering. However, the main difference from a traditional, ‘Western’ 
understanding of forgiveness is Buddhism’s focus on the interconnectedness of things. There 
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is no ‘offender’ to be forgiven, as the victim and the offender are not necessarily seen as 
separate entities (Higgins 2001, cited in Tsang et al. 2005). It is in the self-interest of the 
victim to overcome resentment through compassion and forbearance, independent of a 
remorseful offender. Resentment, the opposite of forgiveness, causes suffering according to 
karma, the law of moral cause and effect (Hallisey 2000, cited in Rye et al. 2000). As we shall 
see, there are similarities between this unilateral understanding of forgiveness and 
unconditional forgiveness as described in the Enright process model. 
 
The Process Model of Forgiveness 
 
The process model of forgiveness, developed by the psychologist Robert Enright and the 
Human Development Study Group (1992), pioneered forgiveness research (Hartwell 2006, 
Freedman et al. 2005). The model describes a step-by-step approach to forgiveness and 
includes elements of revenge and justice until the ultimate goal of genuine forgiveness is 
reached, which results in the final unconditional release of all animosity by the victim. The 
sequence is not meant to be rigid but serves to explain how forgiveness is a process with 
great individual variation. In addition, it highlights the long-term timeframe and the 
complexities involved in forgiving (Freedman et al. 2005). 
 
The process of forgiveness occurs in 20 units which are further divided into four 
phases serving as guideposts that most people experience. The first phase is about 
uncovering the pain and injustices experienced while the second is when the decision to 
forgive is made, even though the person might not feel ready to forgive at the time. The 
third phase, called the work phase, involves reframing the offender and the offence by 
trying to see both the situation and the offender in context. This leads to a better 
understanding of why the hurtful action happened and an acceptance of the pain and its 
consequences, and might lead to feelings of compassion and empathy. The last phase 
represents the outcome. The offended person experiences healing when ‘giving the gift of 
forgiveness’ to the offender (Freedman et al. 2005). 
 
One of the main implications of the model for the use in post-conflict situations is its 
focus on unilateral forgiveness, which does not rely on any action from the perpetrator. A 
relationship between the victim and offender, where the latter apologises and shows acts of 
remorse, might make forgiveness easier, but is not necessary for the forgiveness process to 
move forwards. The goal is unconditional forgiveness. 
 
The two last stages, named ‘Forgiveness as Social Harmony’ and ‘Forgiveness as 
Love’ in Enright’s 1992 version of the model, are particularly interesting for the purposes of 
this chapter. In the penultimate phase justice is perceived as a social contract and it entails 
the acceptance of a variety of opinions. Forgiveness supports social harmony and the view 
that forgiveness can restore harmony in society and decrease friction is motivating to the 
forgiveness process. Coercion is not involved, but the focus is still on the obligation towards 
others rather than on an internally driven will to forgive. Hartwell (2006) observes that the 
discourse of reconciliation and forgiveness under the South African Truth Commission, post-
Apartheid, fits into this description. 
 
In the final stage of the forgiveness model, justice is seen as being a universal and 
ethical principle about all members of society being ends in themselves. Justice is to 
maintain the individual rights of all persons. This understanding of justice is, according to the 
model, considered to lead to a sense of forgiveness as love. The victim has developed 
compassion for the offender, and realises that a hurtful action by another person does not 
alter that sense of love, not unlike the Buddhist emphasis on compassion. According to the 
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model only this last step entails genuine and unconditional forgiveness and a complete 
abandonment of revenge. This stage is an act of self-love and positive group identification. 
The burden of the offence is released by the victim. Hence forgiveness is not depending on 
an offender, social context or a process of negotiated action. This type of forgiveness 
involves the acknowledgement of the past injustice while releasing the hurt of the act. The 
victim decides to respond to the injustice with compassion, even though it is not a duty, 
rather than simply seeking justice through retribution. This is considered the final solution to 
the offence and it ought not to be revisited by the individual or the group involved (Enright 
1992, cited in Hartwell 2006).  
 
Examples of Individual and State-Led Attempts at Reconciliation 
 
Personal Forgiveness 
Concrete examples of individual forgiveness illustrate how complex forgiveness is as well as 
how discreet the process can be. Our understanding of forgiveness as a mechanism for social 
healing is enhanced by knowledge of both the interaction between individuals and groups in 
such a process, as well as by studying how individuals deal with the enterprise. 
 
Gladys June Staines chose to publicly forgive the murder of her husband and two 
sons in Orissa, India, shortly after the crime (Howell 2009). In 1999, the Australian 
missionary Graham Stuart Staines was burnt alive by Hindu extremists while sleeping in a 
van together with his two sons, aged ten and eight (BBC News Online 2005). Four years later, 
one man was given the death sentence and twelve others life imprisonment for the crime. 
By that time the widowed Staines had forgiven the perpetrators. In a statement after the 
conviction, Staines said: ‘I have forgiven the killers and have no bitterness because 
forgiveness brings healing and our land needs healing from hatred and violence. Forgiveness 
and the consequences of the crime should not be mixed up’ (Das 2003). She continued to 
run the leprosy home that she had set up with her husband despite the continuation of 
systematic violence against Christians in Orissa (Howell 2009). Staines also oversaw the 
completion of the Graham Staines Memorial Hospital in her husband’s name. In 2005 she 
was awarded India’s second highest civilian honour the Padma Shri by President A.P.J. Abdul 
Kalam for her social work. At the investiture ceremony Staines said: ‘When people come to 
me and express solidarity with me, I feel that though I have lost my family, I have found 
another one in all the Indians’ (BBC News Online 2005). She once again stressed the 
importance of forgiveness in an interview with the BBC Woman’s hour: 
 
If we don't forgive men of the wrong that they do, then how can we be forgiven? … 
Altogether, I think if we don't forgive, and hold grudges against people, then it 
affects us, creates bitterness in our own life. (BBC 2005) 
 
Staines encouraged forgiveness and religious tolerance in the public discourse in 
Orissa and lobbied the government to take more responsibility in the reconciliation process 
between religious communities. Her exceptional ability to forgive was a positive influence 
towards reconciliation in the local community. Forgiveness does not come naturally to 
people and evidence suggests that even though genuine forgiveness does release all feelings 
of revenge, it must be internally driven and unconditional, making it an extraordinarily 
difficult state for many to attain (Hartwell 2006). 
 
Even though forgiveness is a desirable restorative value, some crimes might be 
considered too serious or delicate to be dealt with by most individuals and through a social 
process. Victim movements caution against putting pressure on victims to forgive by arguing 
they’ll feel better afterwards, as a superficial ‘forgive and forget’ approach might work 
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against its intentions (Braithwaite and Strang 2001). Ash (1997) points out that forgiveness is 
far from desirable or possible in certain situations as taken to the extreme it might actually 
lead to injustices. Forgiveness might imply sacrifices on behalf of victims, setting aside other 
important values, making certain acts unforgivable by the human spirit (Digeser 2001). In 
2006 the Anglican vicar Julie Nicholson resigned as a priest in Bristol, UK, primarily because 
she could not forgive the loss of her daughter Jenny in the London bombings the previous 
year. Nicholson publicly announced that she stepped down because she could not forgive 
the suicide bomber: 
 
I believe that there are some things in life which are unforgivable by the human 
spirit. It’s very difficult for me to stand behind an altar and celebrate the Eucharist, 
the Communion, and lead people in words of peace and reconciliation and 
forgiveness when I feel very far from that myself. So, for the time being, that wound 
in me is having to heal. (BBC 2006) 
 
Nicholson said that not only could she not forgive the killers, but she did not want to 
forgive: ‘I will leave potential forgiveness for whatever is after this life. I will leave that in 
God’s hands.’ Nicholson expressed publicly that she had no compassion for the perpetrators 
and that she simply could not forgive that they chose to take life. ‘I believe some acts are 
humanly unforgivable and rightly so. That does not mean that in absence of forgiveness is 
the need for revenge and anger and bitterness’ (Murray 2006). Nicholson pointed out that 
even though forgiveness is connected with reconciliation, it is possible to work towards the 
latter while leaving forgiveness aside. She also warned against feeling pressure to forgive, 
either from society or religion. When asked whether it was not her Christian obligation to 
forgive, Nicholson quoted Dostoyevsky’s book The Brothers Karamazov: 
 
When your child has been thrown to the dogs a mother dare not forgive. All she can 
hope to forgive is the pain and anguish caused to a mother’s heart, she dare not 
forgive the act that took her child’s life, that act of wickedness … As a mother I dare 
not forgive. I have to speak as I feel, not how I feel I should feel according to a 
doctrine. Forgiving would be like saying this is okay. (Murray 2006) 
 
Nicholson’s account of how difficult, if not impossible, forgiveness after personal 
loss can be, illustrates how intricate the concept of forgiveness is, and highlights the need 
for an approach which is sensitive to individuality. A public forgiveness discourse should 
leave space for individual diversity while taking steps towards a collective narrative of 
reconciliation. 
 
State Justice and Forgiveness 
Reintegration and reconciliation were the driving motives behind the historic apology from 
the Australian government to its indigenous Aboriginal population in 2008. The case 
illustrates how civil society actors are often needed to negotiate the reconciliation process 
between the state and individuals. First of all, such an apology relies on the preposition that 
a state or a nation can be accountable for the actions of individual citizens (Digeser 1998: 
701). Political forgiveness is distinct from personal forgiveness as it operates from the top 
down. The state is mediating or even imposing the process of reconciliation by seeking to 
normalise social relations, while at the same time relying on the ideas of personal 
forgiveness to operate (Derrida 2001, cited in Moran 2006). The official apology by the 
Australian government, for policies of assimilation that took place from the nineteenth 
century to the early 1970s, shows the weakness of limited reconciliation attempts. Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd apologised in parliament to all Aborigines: ‘we apologise for the laws 
8 
 
and policies of successive parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, 
suffering and loss on these our fellow Australians’ (BBC News Online 2008). 
 
The move was met with a mixed response from civil society. A spokesperson from 
the rights group the National Aboriginal Alliance said ‘the word sorry is one that Stolen 
Generation members will be very relived is finally being used’ (BBC News Online 2008). At 
the same time, a number of Aboriginal leaders criticised the fact that the apology was not 
accompanied by any compensation. As one leader put it: ‘Blackfellas will get the words, the 
whitefellas keep the money’ (BBC News Online 2008). The Prime Minister outlined a new 
policy of commitment towards the Aborigines and annual assessment of progress made. In 
February 2010 the annual report on the status of indigenous Australians was publicised and 
Rudd admitted progress towards improving living standards of Aborigines had been slow and 
far from satisfactory. Indigenous children under the age of five are still twice as likely to die 
as non-indigenous infants, referred to by the Prime Minister as a ‘shameful statistic’. While 
Rudd pledged to provide extra government funding for support services to mothers and 
babies, he also described the issue as a top priority (Bryant 2010): 
 
Generations of indigenous disadvantage cannot be turned around overnight. We 
know it will need unprecedented effort by all parts of the Australian community. But 
there is no greater social challenge to Australia than closing this yawning gap. 
 
Moran (2006) is sceptical of this narrow focus on symbolic reconciliation and points 
out that making a distinction between symbolic and material aspects of the process has 
proven unsuccessful in post-conflict processes in countries such as South Africa, Argentina 
and Chile. By not offering compensation or other measures of justice, the Australian 
government seemed to ask for its crimes to be forgiven and forgotten rather than 
fundamentally seeking forgiveness and reconciliation. Rudd was hoping the apology would 
mend the breach between white and black Australians and move the nation towards 
reconciliation and recognition. According to the study ‘Bringing Them Home’, at least 
100,000 Aborigines were taken from their parents - they are the Stolen Generations (Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 1997). The official apology came almost 40 years 
after the programme ended. 
 
When is the attempt to seek forgiveness and apologies good enough? As is the case 
with Truth Commissions, the creation of a common narrative by acknowledging wrongful 
actions needs to be linked with concrete efforts at reconstruction. Its impact would 
otherwise be weakened. Simply telling the ‘truth’– Rudd recognising what happened – is 
unlikely to help individual victims who rely on some tangible response such as reparation in 
order to avoid being left with a sense of helplessness and being sacrificed for the sake of 
society or state (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002). In this case, the long-term characteristics of 
forgiveness as a process seem to have been underplayed and not sufficiently complemented 
by other measures of justice. Unhelpfully, political forgiveness is often depicted as a rational 
and detached response to violence and injustices even though it is unlikely to be removed 
from the emotional aspect of healing after conflict. 
 
Moran (2006) concludes that the history of reconciliation in Australia has been far 
from successful: ‘Irrespective of which understanding of Australian reconciliation one 
adopts, it is plain that it has not achieved the desired results.’ She points out that the 
existing framework for reconciliation, based on the state, has constrained the process 
towards transformation of society: ‘Australian reconciliation has, for the most part, been a 
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federal government policy — initiated, implemented, limited and finally “provided” by the 
various governments and governmental bodies’ (Moran 2006: 132). 
 
Hartwell (2006) suggests that the acknowledgement of the complexity of the 
interaction between group and individual is key to a positive social transformation, an 
element that has been lacking in Australia. A top-down approach to reconciliation and 
forgiveness simply cannot lead to healing and a new collective narrative. 
 
Truth Commissions highlight the tension between justice, forgiveness and 
reconciliation in a public context. As an official body set up to investigate human rights 
abuses or violations of international law, it is often referred to as having a cathartic effect on 
society by officially acknowledging a silenced past (Hayner 1994). Its aim is social rather than 
legal justice, as a Truth Commission does not seek formal legal accountability in order to 
prosecute individuals responsible for crimes (Hayner 1994: 604). Truth and reconciliation 
commissions can offer an important complement to both traditional trials and forgiveness, 
but the contribution is somewhat ambiguous. 
 
Moon (cited in Skaar 2009) raises a number of important questions about such 
commissions which are directly relevant to the forgiveness discourse: ‘does truth lead to 
reconciliation? Does truth heal? Can there be reconciliation without an account of past 
atrocities?’ In her recent book Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Moon shows how such assumptions became part of the 
reconciliation process in post-Apartheid South Africa, but only partially capture the truth. 
She argues that reconciliation is a political practice rather than a normative or purely moral 
enterprise. Political reconciliation was the main goal of the truth and reconciliation 
commissions rather than restorative measures, even though it also promoted interpersonal 
forgiveness and acknowledgement. This conflict was problematic for the victims. The 
perpetrators were granted immediate amnesty in return for full confessions, rather than 
remorse. Victims, on the other hand, had to wait years for financial reparation by the 
government (Moon, cited in Skaar 2009). This critique stresses the tension between justice 
and forgiveness as well as between individual and social forgiveness. Society or the state 
cannot forgive on behalf of individual victims. Because of the ‘emotional’ nature of 
forgiveness, it needs to be addressed in a way that is sensitive to the individuals involved. It 
is vital to avoid the perception of forgiveness being imposed by the state or political 
institutions. 
 
Through collective dialogue civil society can play a key role towards reconciling a 
new vision of society with a shared history and identity. An official account of past atrocities 
and acknowledgement of responsibility by the relevant parties is important, however 
difficult it might be to establish ‘the truth’. Such steps ought to be combined with restorative 
measures as well as approaches towards forgiveness.  
 
Forgiveness and Civil Society 
 
By accommodating forgiveness, civil society actors can play a crucial role for conflict 
resolution and can motivate reconciliation and justice by mending the gap between state 
and individuals. As we have seen, reconciliation is not an action that can be easily mandated 
by the international community or the state. 
 
Reconciliation involves the acknowledgement of past hurt, compensation as well as 
the establishment of a new vision of society (Moran 2006). It is most fruitfully understood as 
both a short- and long-term development. In the short term, it is a pragmatic cooperation 
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process between former enemies seeking to rebuild economic, political and social 
institutions. In the long term, it is a procedure which might encompass multiple generations. 
The process of social healing is strongly influenced by three main factors: the interaction 
between various perceptions of justice, the formation of identity as either victim or 
perpetrator and finally, the personal and political processes of forgiveness as well as revenge 
(Hartwell 2006). In many cases, the process of establishing who are victims and who are 
offenders is far from clear cut, making it problematic to suggest who should forgive whom. 
In addition, it is often the case that the presence or availability of an offender capable of 
apologising and asking the victim for forgiveness is lacking. The offender might be 
unavailable or unapologetic. The quality of local, national and international leadership is key 
in this process, as is an understanding of the cultural and societal norms that impact the 
prospect of reconciliation. Civil society can influence the collective narrative of justice, 
memory and identity in this fragile process. However, Moran emphasises the importance of 
the parties in a reconciliation process to share a common language and cultural 
understanding of terms such as forgiveness, apology and compensation. This is fundamental 
for their ability to meet with parity in a dialogue mutually conducive to reconciliation 
(Moran 2006). 
 
Even though the state can only do so much towards social transformation, the 
determinants that influence individual behaviour both during and after conflict are social. 
Mass violence is a problem of community and not only individual responsibility therefore the 
solution post-conflict must be collective. At the same time, even though mass violence is a 
totalising experience, it is ultimately an intimate and personal one, as noted by Jaspers 
(1947). It is this individual experience which will influence one’s perceptions post-conflict 
and these voices must be taken into account when considering the best approach to social 
healing. These issues highlight the potential role in the reconciliation process of all those 
institutions between the individual and the state: family, schools, private organisations, 
faith-based organisations, private workplaces, social movements and communities. 
 
As Hartwell (2006) points out, Enright’s model for the process of forgiveness opens 
up the possibility of individuals to forgive other individuals rather than their representative 
group, and hence might offer a way to overcome the controversial issue of identifying 
victims and offenders. The model also emphasises that the forgiveness process is 
fundamentally an individual act based on a choice of forgiving and moving on, which does 
not rely on the presence of an offender. This approach can equally be shared by a group 
with common goals and extended to motivate collective decisions that can have tremendous 
benefits for communities and societies confronting the difficult task of moving on from past 
atrocities. As we have seen, the interaction between individual and community or society is 
crucial in this process. 
 
Hartwell (1999) describes the forgiveness process as a ‘constantly evolving, dynamic 
interaction’ between bottom-up and top-down actors. Individuals influence group behaviour 
and identity, while groups led by acknowledged leaders, influence individual beliefs. From 
fieldwork interviews in post-conflict Serbia, Northern Ireland and South Africa, Hartwell’s 
most significant finding was the long-term nature of the forgiveness process: a phase of 
passive resentment tends to characterise the current post-conflict generation while a need 
for seeking forgiveness can be found in subsequent generations or in diasporas. The phase 
refers to ‘a forbearance from revenge accompanied by a reluctance to forgive’, an 
emotionally ambivalent attitude which can be politically useful due to its pragmatism. These 
findings show the need for a practical approach to forgiveness, such as the one outlined in 
the process model by Enright (1992). 
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A point of divergence among forgiveness scholars is the relationship between victim 
and offender. Can forgiveness be unconditional? Alternative forgiveness models emphasise 
the dialogue between victim and offender. Andrews (2000) describes a ‘negotiated 
forgiveness’ process focused on confession, ownership and repentance as well as a 
‘positional forgiveness’ process where individuals are seen as part of a group. Positional 
forgiveness is concentrating on the individual’s role in the conflict, as offences are more 
often than not committed as a group member rather than as an individual. Andrews (2000) 
suggests that such an approach to the offence is fruitful because social position can be 
confronted, understood and potentially forgiven. However, these methods can be 
accommodated by the Enright model as earlier stages in the forgiveness process. 
 
Montiel (2000) advocates an approach where forgiveness is acted out collectively in 
what she refers to as ‘socio-political forgiveness’. A whole group of victims release their 
collective resentment and condemnation of the group considered to be the offenders. Such 
a process depends on a number of particular factors for it to be effective: leadership, 
individual support of the public narrative of forgiveness and restoration of intergroup social 
fairness. The leaders of the victimised groups should be able to relate to the perpetrators in 
a forgiving, but effective manner and the public declarations of forgiveness have to be 
sensitive to the positions of the individuals involved. One of the main challenges when 
encouraging forgiveness is not to underestimate the pain and hurt of the individual who 
might not be in a position to forgive. Initiatives towards reconciliation and a perception of 
reinstating justice are crucial and work in combination with the offender’s repentance and 
apology and the individual victim’s readiness to forgive. Hence, Montiel (2000) highlights the 
need for socio-political mechanisms of justice for a productive forgiveness discourse, the 




A productive approach to the intricate concept of forgiveness is to consider it a process of 
multiple stages. Even though it is the focus on values that distinguishes forgiveness from 
other types of justice, a pragmatic understanding of the enterprise as an approach to social 
healing is valuable. The argument of this chapter is that forgiveness ought to be considered 
an important complement to traditional measures of justice. However, it does not preclude 
justice and essential compensational measures. 
 
We have examined the complexities involved in the forgiveness discourse, especially 
related to the discreteness of the concept and the problem of promoting it top-down from 
the level of the state. Ultimately, forgiveness does not have to rely on action by the 
offender, but might in fact be a unilateral process, particularly in its final stages. 
Nonetheless, it is recognised that unconditional forgiveness is extremely challenging and 
does not come naturally. 
 
Civil society offers an arena where individuals, groups and political institutions can 
interact and work together towards forgiveness and reconciliation. Civil society actors can be 
sensitive to individual concerns while creating a new vision for society based on a collective 
narrative of history, memory and identity. The process model of forgiveness describes how 
an ‘education’ in forgiveness can help individuals towards that goal. 
 
Most importantly, forgiveness must be internally driven and not motivated by 
external pressure. If internal motivation can be encouraged, forgiveness can release the hurt 
of past atrocities, enable healing and reconciliation, and offer the parties in a post-conflict 
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